Michael Brindle QC dicusses the UK statutory provisions relating to money laundering and examines differing views on the scope of their application to the complex areas of tax evasion and foreign fiscal offences. E veryone has an instinctive concept of money laundering: the handling of the proceeds of crime, its disguise and apparently regular transfer within the banking system. It was for this sort of activity that EC Directive 91/308, OJ 1991 L166/77, came into existence. In the UK, those involved in money laundering can be pursued through the criminal courts; It is, however, abundantly clear that the UK legislature decided to go significantly further than it was required to do by the EC directive. Article 15 of the directive specifically permits member states to adopt stricter provisions than the directive itself demands, and this is precisely what happened in the UK.
Criterion of assistance
the fact of assistance in retention of control; and the knowledge or suspicion by the assister that A had in the past been engaged in criminal conduct.
Knowledge and suspicion are obviously broad concepts.
Suspicion is sufficient, and, in the case of investment or tax advisers, as well as certain legal advisers, it is possible to take the view that the adviser should be suspicious in almost all circumstances when a large sum of money appears from no very clearly defined source.
How widely, however, will the courts interpret the concept of 'suspicion'? It is likely that they will require more than simply the world-weariness of the experienced professional financial or tax adviser. If the case were to come before the criminal courts, solid evidence would be required on which to ground any suspicion of engagement in criminal conduct. An investment, tax or legal adviser will often have only partial knowledge of a client's affairs, and in such circumstances the court would be keen to ensure that unreasonable and unfair burdens were not imposed upon the professional. Conversely, where a client has delegated the conduct of his financial affairs to such a person, it will be much more difficult for that professional to deny sufficient knowledge of the client's affairs.
It will be necessary to see howr the law develops, but it is interesting to note that, in the parallel area of civil liability, the 
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How widely, however, will the courts interpret the concept of 'suspicion'? It is likely that they will require more than simply the world-weariness of the experienced professional financial or tax adviser. If the case were to come before the criminal courts, solid evidence would be required on which to ground any suspicion of engagement in criminal conduct.
A different view was taken by Rimer J in Brinks Ltd v Elcombe
(The Times, 23 October 1995) although it does not seem that he was referred to the remarks of Millett J. I have little doubt that the courts, both civil and criminal, would be likely for the most part to follow the views of Millett J. If a professional person knows or suspects that his or her client is involved in some form of dishonest and criminal activity, it is a very uncertain defence to say that he or she did not spot the precise form of dishonest and criminal activity actually being perpetrated.
OFF-SHORE ACTIVITIES
The most remarkable feature of the new legislation is its o extension, through s. 93A (7), to the facilitation of criminal conduct taking place outside the UK. It should be noted that Part I of the 1993 Act, which has not yet been brought into effect, seeks to extend the jurisdiction of the UK courts in respect of offences with significant foreign elements. Part III of the 1993 Act deals with money laundering. Section 93A (7) (cited above) reads as follows: It seems to me that there is a difference. In the case of theft, the identity of the victim is irrelevant to the nature and characteristics of the offence of theft. In the case of tax evasion, however, the particular relationship between the tax evader and his local tax authority may well differ widely between different jurisdictions. In some countries it may be incumbent on a tax payer to volunteer a tax return, giving full and frank information about his financial affairs, whilst in another it may be up to the tax authorities to find the facts and impose a tax charge on the individual. The nature and extent of taxpayers' obligations vary considerably throughout the world, as do the nature and extent of the different taxes which different countries impose on different persons for different reasons. The translation of a foreign tax authority into an English one is not a straightforward matter at all. If the 1993 Act had clearly intended to apply to foreign tax evasion, clearer words than those to be found in s. 93A(7) would have been appropriate. For the English criminal court to ignore the particular requirements and characteristics of a foreign revenue authority and simply proceed as if the Inland Revenue were involved, is to overlook the particular characteristics of the foreign revenue authority. Since, as pointed out above, there is no 'double criminality' requirement, such an approach would render the particular characteristics and requirements of the foreign revenue authority irrelevant, and the criminality of the assistance and the retention of the proceeds of criminal conduct would be judged entirely on the basis of an artificial assumption that the foreign revenue authority is to be equated in all respects with the UK Inland Revenue. It is questionable whether the statute is sufficiently clearly defined to achieve this improbable purpose.
Support is given to these doubts as to the application of the However, it is essential to read the judgment in that case on the basis that it is concerned with extradition, and not with the indictment in England of a person charged with the contravention of foreign tax law.
The most remarkable feature of the new legislation is its extension, through s. 93A (7), to the facilitation of criminal conduct taking place outside the UK. It should be noted that Part I of the 1993 Act, which has not yet been brought into effect, seeks to extend the jurisdiction of the UK courts in respect of offences with significant foreign elements.
In 1988, when the case was argued, the 1993 Criminal Justice Act had not even been thought of. The concept of someone being put through the English criminal courts for breach of a foreign tax statute would have seemed to the judges who decided that case to be novel. There was no precedent whatsoever for any such criminal jurisdiction, and therefore the references in the judgment to 'criminal' law were plainly intended as a reference, and only as a reference to the law of extradition itself, which for certain purposes at least is part of the criminal law. Any It is clear that the court could not comprehend that criminal jurisdiction (i.e. jurisdiction to try a defendant, and not to extradite him) could arise at all in respect of conduct committed abroad, let alone the breach of foreign revenue law. Such a possibility being unthinkable, the court was only concerned as to the distinction between civil proceedings and extradition proceedings. If, contrary to the assumption in the judgment, it were possible (as it now is since 1993) for criminal jurisdiction to be founded (extradition apart) in respect of crimes committed abroad, or in respect of assistance given to laundering the proceeds of crimes committed abroad, then there will be every reason to treat such criminal proceedings according to the same principle as applies to civil proceedings, as opposed to the principle applying to extradition proceedings. The general philosophy underlying the application of the principle appears to apply to criminal proceedings of such a nature, which broadly speaking amount to an attempt to enforce foreign revenue laws,
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in clear contrast to the situation which arises on an extradition request by a foreign state, where by definition the English court is not exercising its own jurisdiction to try the defendant, but simply considering returning that person to a 'home' jurisdiction. Whilst this may be reassuring on the practical level, it appears to suggest that the legislation does indeed apply in principle to foreign tax evasion. The UK government's attitude to tax evasion generally and the role of the remaining British offshore jurisdictions has changed significantly since 1997, and it may be that there is now governmental support lor the idea that the 1993 money laundering legislation can and should be applied to those who assist in the retention of the proceeds of foreign tax evasion. Whether or not that is the case, it does not seem that the legislation, when passed, either had that object or was intended to extend so far beyond the ambit of the EC directive.
That there are two schools of thought on this issue cannot be doubted. If the view based upon the analogy with extradition is well founded, it significantly increases the risk that professionals dealing in investment, tax or legal advice here might become o 'to o embroiled in breach of the criminal law. Because of the comparatively low threshold of 'suspicion', it will be very difficult to be certain in many situations that a particular client has not been engaged in or benefited to some extent from some evasion of foreign tax law. Although it is clearly not incumbent upon the English professional to research the foreign tax law, the application of s. 93A(7) to such facts will potentially bring within the ambit of the criminal statute many situations which arise regularly in practice. The problem of identifying the 'proceeds' of such criminal conduct will be one factor in inhibiting prosecutions of this nature, whilst another will obviously be the doubt as to whether the act applies to foreign fiscal offences at all. I am not aware of any fiscal offence case yet where the act has been used. I doubt whether there will be one, at least until and unless the authorities have established a reasonably firm basis for the operation of the act in relation to what might be described as more traditional money laundering activities. @
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